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Abstract
Recent conflicts in the South African mining sector tend to be explained 
entirely in rational choice theory. This paper utilises grounded theory, where the 
primary method was the collection of semi-structured and exclusive interviews 
triangulated with secondary data consisting of existing literature, government 
and company reports. The findings challenge the rational choice approach which 
is used to explain the root cause of mineral conflicts on the African continent. 
The research makes two contributions; first it shows that empowerment policies 
have worsened the socio-economic disparities of mineworkers and their 
respective communities in the North West province of South Africa. Second, 
it demonstrates inequality has led to a recurrence of labour unrest due to poor 
labour standards, wage disparities and poor living conditions for mineworkers. 
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1. Introduction
In 2014, South Africa experienced its longest and costliest strike, a five-month 
long stoppage in the platinum industry, which resulted in the economy contracting 
0.6 per cent. The stoppage affected mines in the North West province of South 
Africa, where the bulk of production took place, representing 40 per cent of 
international production (Financial Mail, 2014). Similarly, in 2012, the 0.5 per 
cent contraction of the South African economy was mainly due to the labour 
unrest in Marikana in the North-West province where 34 mineworkers were 
killed. The South African platinum mine companies, Anglo American Platinum 
Limited (Amplats), Impala Platinum Holdings Limited (Implats) and Lonmin 
PLC (Lonmin), control more than 80 per cent of the global platinum reserves. 
Lonmin Executive Vice President of Communications and Public Affairs, Lerato 
Molebatsi (2015) stated, ‘The Marikana tragedy … at Lonmin should serve as 
a platform to learn [from] the unfortunate mistakes [of] all players within the 
industry so as not to repeat them; however, with the 2014 platinum strike, it 
seems … we did not learn’. 
    Theorists such as Collier and various other authors would posit the Marikana 
conflict in terms of rational choice theory: the “opportunity for political elites to 
loot the resources of their countries” (Obi, 2009 p.108). Yet according to Bond 
(2014), the Marikana massacre exemplified the society’s more general resource 
curse when the ruling party (collaborate via the mining and police ministers) 
allow the police force to serve white-dominated multinational capital by killing 
dozens of black workers to end the strike. Rational choice theory emulates a lack 
of economic growth trajectory and poor development which theorists argue is the 
resource curse that occurs in mineral rich African countries. The resource curse 
is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that focuses on the relationship between 
natural resource endowment and poor economic performance, civil war and 
authoritarianism (Rosser, 2006). Obeng-Odoom (2012) however asserts that in 
the “real world’ blessings, uncertainties and curses co-exist, intermingle and 
co-evolve differently across the social groups and classes, thereby dismissing 
the assertion that there is a trade-off between resource wealth, economic 
performance and conflicts. Rosser (2006) concurs that the evidence that natural 
resource abundance is associated with various negative development outcomes 
is inconclusive, its explanations for the resource curse inadequately accounts 
for the role of social forces or external political and economic environments, 
prognosis of addressing the resource curse ignores the issue of political feasibility 
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and scholars failed to acknowledged that the political and social variables are 
shaped by a range of historical and other factors in each case. Obeng-Odoom 
(2010) indicated that studies in Niger Delta revealed that mono-causal models 
are inadequate explanations for the resource curse framework because they are 
ahistorical and failed to factor in contemporary factors that include local and 
international dimensions. The root causes of conflict in Africa are complex and 
beyond mono-causal or cultural explanations and should include the role of 
global processes and transnational forces (Obi, 2009) thus further research is 
required. This paper argues that the recurrence of labour unrest in the mining 
sector between 2007 and 2014 is beyond explanation of traditional rational 
choice theory; an alternative discourse regarding the causes of conflict within 
the South African context that factors in global processes, historical and social 
forces particularly that of labour instability.  
In South Africa there is a gap with respect to empirical studies on rational 
choice theory; studies often focused on resource based African countries such 
as Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Angola. This study cannot be confined to rational 
choice theory as there are other dynamics that have caused conflict within the 
South African mining sector.  According to Fine (2008, p.21), ‘the emergence 
of a new black elite through Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) or, more 
exactly, Black Elite Economic Enrichment, BEEE’, is primarily ‘through the 
gains spun off through financial restructuring. It represents a (fraction of a) class 
in the making, one that is entirely dysfunctional and parasitical for development’. 
Much has been written that Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) has only 
succeeded in widening the inequality gap by making a few politically-connected 
black individuals wealthier at the expense of the greater society (Cargill, 2010; 
Emkes, 2012; Tangri & Southall, 2008).
2. The data and methods
The research utilised grounded theory, where the primary methods were the 
collection of semi-structured and exclusive interviews with mining houses, 
key politicians, businesspersons, policy-makers, trade unionists and political 
commentators (refer to Appendix A for a detailed list of interviews and 
explanation of research methodology). The study sought to investigate whether 
the shift towards social awareness by mining firms is focused evenly between 
black ownership and socio-economic development in the mining sector? The 
study adopted an inductive approach where the data emerges from the ground 
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(key role players across the classes) and provides a theoretical explanation from 
the insider perspective. The inductive approach was amenable to allow the 
emergence of an alternative theory from key role players in the South African 
mining sector. Instead of starting the data collection with the possible potential 
leading of explanations gained from the existing literature which is often guided 
by the positivism stance the study adopted a constructivist approach where 
explanations are constructed through role-player perspectives. The resource 
curse was birthed from a positivist orientation insistent on economic growth 
and market extension with limited attention to challenging capitalism (Obeng-
Odoom, 2015). This study adopted an approach that goes beyond the positivist 
orientation that allows for other factors such as the historical and social factors 
in the relationship with natural resource needs to be taken into consideration. 
Thus the research question was broad without clinical narrow hypothesis that 
could have confined the study to existing rational choice explanations. The 
primary fieldwork was conducted between July 2009 and December 2010, with 
subsequent research undertaken between 2012 and 2015, due to the changes 
in B-BBEE legislation (RSA, 2012), the Marikana strike in 2012 and the 2014 
Platinum strike.
This paper analysed the mining sector’s empowerment policies (the Mining 
Charter), which aims to transform the working and living conditions of 
mineworkers and their respective communities, through the use of exclusive 
interviews triangulated with secondary data. The research shows that 
empowerment policies have made limited inroads into addressing the socio-
economic conditions of mineworkers and their respective communities. 
Since the new democratic dispensation in 1994, laws aimed at empowering 
the majority of South Africans have empowered only a select few wealthy 
black South Africans. The emphasis of empowerment policies is on skills and 
socio-economic development while simultaneously enfranchising black South 
Africans to own or manage mines; however, this has led to the recurrence of 
labour unrest within the mining sector. 
3. Results
The results of this paper provides a brief overview of the Mining Charter. 
Thereafter, the asymmetric nature between the intended purpose of the mining 
charter and the emergence of a black elite. This is followed by arguments that 
empowerment policies aimed at the upliftment of mineworkers and surrounding 
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communities have been accompanied by patterns of disempowerment due to 
deteriorating labour standards, poor socio-economic conditions and wage 
disparities. The final section highlights the imbalance between black ownership 
and the socio-economic elements of empowerment.
3.1 Labour empowerment in the South African Extractive Industries 
The BEE policy was initiated by the South African government to redress 
the legacy of apartheid. The policy’s purpose is to bring about economic 
transformation by increasing the number of black people that manage, own and 
control the country’s economy thus creating sustainable employment, addressing 
the inequality gap and alleviating poverty (BEE Com, 2001; Herringer et al., 
2009; Viviers et al., 2009),  therefore the existing wealth within the South 
African economy will be redistributed in order to benefit the majority of the 
population. (Tangri & Southall, 2008).  Madi (2006) subscribed to the argument 
that black empowerment in the South African context is a discourse with an 
‘evolution of terminology [used] towards integrating blacks into the mainstream 
South African economy’ (p. 7); in other words, not merely ownership of private 
enterprise, but also the socio-economic upliftment of workers and their respective 
communities. According to Obeng-Odoom (2016) libertarian paternalism 
nudges actors towards behaviours that will empower indigenous labour without 
the negative impact on the industry, BEE policy is characterised by libertarian 
paternalism which has however institutionalised systemic inequality and labour 
exploitation within the mining sector.  
3.1.1 The mining charter 
Post 1994, the empowerment strategy saw an increase from zero per cent to over 
twenty per cent of Black stakeholders on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
With reference to the mining sector, over the last 10 years, the transfer from 
white ownership to black ownership increased from 15 per cent to 26 per cent 
(Mathews, 2012). Bezuidenhout (2008) argues that the intention of  ‘narrow’ or 
‘top down’  BEE  was the transfer from white to black ownership in the mining 
sector as opposed to the subsequent legislated Broad Based approach which 
envisioned to transform the shop floor of the mining sector; instead there have 
been an immense number of employment cuts since 1994.   
The degree of transformation in ownership transfer has seen gains for only 
a few South Africans. The bone of contention is that economic empowerment 
policies such as the Mining Charter, ‘sought to end the situation in which the 
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historically dominant mining houses stockpiled minerals rights’ (Gumede, 2008, 
p. 252). According to Former Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel (2010):
Starting with mining it was agreed that the mineral rights would be returned to 
the ownership of the people that was done as a very first and an important step 
in the content of the Minerals and Petroleum of the Resources Development Act 
(MPRDA). The rights were transferred and anybody who wanted access of those 
rights needed to secure a licence. If they (mining houses such as Anglo American, 
De Beers etc.) wanted that right, they would need to take black partners to ratio.  
Consequently the ‘impetus for mining firms to qualify under the charter 
essentially set up a race on empowerment grounds, [no company wanted to 
be viewed as rejecting transformation and] therefore risking the government 
viewing their applications in a dim light’ (Ponte, Roberts & Van Sittert, 2006, 
p. 25). Former Minister in the Presidency and Head of Policy Formulation, Joel 
Netshitenzhe (2009) argues:
    There will be those industries, such as mining, where in the first instance to operate 
you will have to conform to government regulations and meet deadlines. These 
are the conditions on which you have to get a licence, and these licences will be 
reviewed on an on-going basis.
The Mining Charter was accompanied by scorecard codes of good practice, 
which scored a company from an excellent Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (B-BBEE) contributor to a non-compliant one. Companies 
that achieved the targets would obtain government contracts and licences. The 
Mining Charter had relatively few concrete targets, as the scorecard was a mere 
‘tick box’ approach rather than a concerted effort to overcome socio-economic 
disparities in post-apartheid South Africa. Due to the Mining Charter’s focusing 
on black ownership, which was a top-down approach, more stringent measures 
by the government were legislated to include a bottom-up approach, based on 
the B-BBEE Act of 2003. 
The revised charter stipulated that mining companies allocate 51 per cent of 
their spending to Historically Disadvantaged South Africans (HDSA’s) (who 
were disenfranchised prior to the democratic dispensation in 1994) to address 
the poverty barrier through social and community development, 23 per cent 
towards skills development and business opportunities, and the remaining 26 
per cent is weighted in accordance with creating economic opportunities for 
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black South Africans (DTI, 2012). Should mining houses fail to comply with 
the targets, their licenses may be revoked. Prior to the revised charter, ‘Mining 
companies agreed, among other things, to offer all employees the opportunity to 
become functionally literate and numerate by 2005; to aspire to 40 per cent black 
participation in management within five years; to upgrade hostels and convert 
them to family units; and to promote home ownership for mine employees’ 
(Kane Berman, 2014, p . 9).
All the interviews conducted between 2014 and 2015 discussed the Mining 
Charter, as a transformational tool that was designed to address the unique 
challenges within the South African mining sector with reference to ensuring 
black ownership of mines and socio-economic development of  Historically 
Disadvantaged South Africans (HDSA’s). Since 1997, mining companies have 
spent more than R340 billion on economic transformation programmes in South 
Africa. The Chamber of Mines claims to spend more on social programmes 
than any other sector of the economy, an estimated R1.3 billion in 2011-2012 
alone (Kane-Berman, 2014, P10).  According to Lonmin,  in 2014, the platinum 
company transferred 18 per cent of the operations to HDSA’s consisting of 
‘three broad based economic empowerment deals with the Bapo Ba-Mogale, 
Marikana Community and Employee Share Trusts’ (Lonmin, 2014, p.10). 
While Implats invested ‘R71 million in socio-economic development projects, 
and an additional R261 million towards improving accommodation and living 
conditions for employees’ (Implats, 2014, p.7).
According to the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) Transformation 
Manager, Luthando Brukwe (2015) ‘the challenge does not lie with the Mining 
Charter and the Acts, but rather with industry and government. Industry is 
reluctant to comply and government is reluctant to enforce’. While some mining 
companies agree with NUM’s assertions that there are challenges with the Mining 
Charter, Amplats’ Head of Transformation, Lusani Nevhutalu (2015), contends 
that there needs to be less of a tick box approach and more qualitative measures: 
   B-BBEE started off as BEE. With BEE the beneficiaries were a few politically 
connected individuals. Despite being broad-based with the different pillars, the 
outcome does not lead to the desired effect. You still find people who have not seen 
or experienced the changes. The challenge lies in the fact that quantitative measures 
have been used whereas we need to use qualitative measures. Those who implement 
B-BBEE do the very minimum and often do it for compliance purposes.
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3.1.2. The asymmetric nature of ‘economic’ empowerment 
This paper contends that the asymmetric nature of economic empowerment 
sees the emergence of a black elite and the prominence of clientelist relations, 
rather than the intended socio-economic upliftment of mineworkers and their 
respective communities in the North West province mining belt.    
Based on the KPMG Annual report which measures economic empowerment, 
the Mining Charter is a worthy policy document however it is weak on 
implementation, as it favours a narrow-based approach that focuses on the 
black ownership element. More recently, the consolidation of the black elite has 
rendered the broad-based approach to empowerment unsatisfactory.  According 
to Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC) 2014 report, ‘most mining companies are on 
track to meet most of the Mining Charter requirements specifically that of black 
ownership. However, Housing & Living Conditions, Services Procurement and 
Employment Equity (Senior Management and Middle Management) still seem 
to be a challenge’ (PWC, 2014, p.21).
3.1.2.1 The emergence of a black elite 
The mining sector was the first to implement empowerment policies and one of 
the largest BEE contributors to the transfer of ownership from white to black 
stakeholders. The ownership deals, estimated at a quarter of a trillion rand, have 
benefited a select few black elite; few of these benefits have filtered down to the 
majority of mineworkers, who earn an estimated R10 000.00 per month.
The mining sector positioned itself as the key driver of BEE (Bezuidenhout, 
2008) aimed at overcoming historical and social inequalities. According to 
former Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin (2010): 
There was no doubt that the mining sector was a path breaker; by and large the 
charter is pretty good. When government was creating the scope for empowerment, 
it was probably the most comprehensive intervention made by any government.
Subsequently, companies opted for ‘fronting’ to ensure compliance with the 
policy; this can be described as a white individual requesting a black individual 
(regardless of their business acumen) to set up a company as a front to obtain 
lucrative government contracts. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
reported 22 cases of fronting from January to December 2006, and a further 
15 cases between January and July 2007. Former Trade and Industry Minister, 
Mandisi Mpahlwa said, ‘one of the bigger problems that BEE has thrown up so 
far is fronting, which is under the microscope and tougher legislation was in the 
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pipeline’ (Terreblanche, 2007, p. 2). Economist, Reg Rumney (2010) comments: 
‘BEE, which has now been changed to that of B-BBEE, tends to be a ‘soft’ law. 
In other words, it rewards [compliance] rather than punishes those who do not 
comply’. The difficulty exists that while a company that does not comply will 
be at a disadvantage when doing business with government, the law does not 
dictate that failure to comply will lead to prosecution. Erwin (2010) concurs: 
…black people did not have capital, so one of the dangers with ownership structures, 
and even with the Charter, is that you tend to get a fairly high level of heavy loans, 
or you got a danger of fronting. One inevitably was to get a Charter, which is more 
complex to avoid some of those problems. 
  Despite the Mining Charter of 2003, seven years later the mining sector 
continued to implement a narrow-based approach to empowerment (a top-down 
approach) as their priorities included primarily black ownership, management 
control and enterprise development (KPMG, 2009; 2010). According to the 
KPMG (2012) report, which measures the progress of B-BBEE, the focus on 
ownership and management control in the sector could be ‘based on the strong 
links with government and its previous focus on narrow-based BEE (ownership 
and management control) as opposed to B-BBEE (which focuses on all scorecard 
elements/weightings including skills and socio-economic development)’.  Thabo 
Mosombuka (2009), former official of South Africa’s Department of Trade and 
Industry, argued that ‘The mining codes [Charter] focus more on ownership. I 
would say that because of the peculiarity of the industry, where your mineral 
resources are the main source of investment’.
    As a result of the inadequacies of the B-BBEE Mining Charter, political 
analysts such as Moeletsi Mbeki argued that the, ‘BEE policy was flawed from 
the outset, the real idea was to buy off the leadership of the black resistance 
movement’ (Mathews, 2012; Boraine, 2014; Tangri & Southall, 2008). Indeed 
senior members who were part of the ruling party, the African National Congress 
(ANC) concur, former ANC National Executive Committee Chairperson, 
Mosiuoa Lekota (2010) argued, ‘you must remember BEE was to open existing 
wealth and enable black sections to cash’. The most notable BEE deal took 
place in the mining sector, Patrice Motsepe’s African Rainbow Minerals (ARM) 
teamed up with Harmony Gold to buy AngloGold’s Free State gold mining 
assets for R2.2 billion in a 50/50 venture. Tokyo Sexwale’s Mvelaphanda placed 
its stakes on diamond mining by raising its interest in Trans Hex to 24.5 per 
cent (Gumede, 2007). ‘The biggest transaction was the unbundling of Anglo-
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American (reflected in the significant fall in its control of JSE listed companies 
in the 1990s) and the sale of identified assets to black investors’ (Ponte, Roberts 
& van Sittert, 2006, p. 35). 
According to Former Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel (2010), ‘Anglo-
American was one of the largest mining houses due to its monopoly on surface 
rights’. Anglo-American sold off JCI (a mining firm) and Johnnic (an industrial 
group), after setting aside for itself what proved to be the most successful 
component, Amplats (the world’s largest platinum company). 
Ernst and Young Management Services reported in 2003 that close to R54 
billion worth of BEE deals were made. The beneficiaries of these deals were 
largely the politically well-connected elite: 60 per cent was accrued to the 
companies of two individuals, Patrice Motsepe and Tokyo Sexwale. The mining 
sector was the first to ensure black empowerment deals, creating billionaires 
such as Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale, Patrice Motsepe and Saki Macozoma 
(Ponte, Roberts & van Sittert, 2007).
3.1.2.2 Clientelist relations
The patterns of empowerment include that of patronage and clientelism, which 
can be illustrated by the top millionaires who are politically connected and have 
acquired wealth through empowerment policies. Ramaphosa is one of South 
Africa’s most well connected corporate leaders and the Deputy President of the 
country. According to the Forbes listing, Ramaphosa is the 29th richest man in 
Africa, due to Shanduka Group stakes in mining entities. He is also a former 
shareholder and director of platinum company, Lonmin. His fellow South 
African, tycoon Patrice Motsepe, is the 10th richest man in Africa. He made his 
money in mining as a result of the purchasing of low-producing gold mine shafts 
in 1994, which he made profitable. Since then, he has built ARM, benefiting as 
a result of South Africa’s BEE laws (Forbes, 2012; 2013; News24, 2010). One 
of the largest empowerment deals in 2003 was between ARM Gold and Avmin. 
Analyses revealed that at least 72 per cent of the total deal value benefited six 
of the narrow-based black consortia, namely ARM Gold (60 r per cent owned 
by Motsepe family trust), Mvelaphanda (Sexwale), Shanduka (Ramaphosa), 
Safika (Macozoma), Kagiso and Tiso (Dunnigan, 2005). Based on the research, 
it is evident that most BEE deals (including the broad-based approach, which 
advocates a bottom-up approach) involved the same individuals, i.e. the 
recurrence of an elite class. 
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According to McGregor (2005), there were eight black entrepreneurs in the 
top 50 directors, in terms of the value of their shareholdings on the JSE. These 
were led by the Elephant Consortium, with an estimated R40 billion stake in 
the former state utility, Telkom and Patrice Motsepe, with his estimated R13 
billion ownership of ARM. Others include Tokyo Sexwale, the Royal Bafokeng 
Nation and the Mineworkers Investment Corporation (the investment arm of 
the NUM). The wealth of black business magnates is still predictably small 
in comparison to that held by families such as the Oppenheimer’s and the 
Rupert’s that have dominated South African business since the early twentieth 
century (Ponte, Roberts & van Sittert, 2006). The mining sector operates in 
an oligopolistic manner, as it is difficult for new firms to enter and expand 
without the connections of the existing dominant players. The focus on overall 
ownership and control is emulated in the concentration found in individual 
industries. Characteristically one, two or three firms dominate any given industry 
or sector with their positions entrenched through vertical relationships upstream 
into sources of inputs, and downstream into distribution and marketing (Ponte, 
Roberts & van Sittert, 2006; Van Wyk, 2009).
Van Wyk (2009) illustrates a strong consolidation of the black elite class 
within the South African context, i.e. those who are in a position of power, 
such as businesspersons and family members. By definition, the perpetuation of 
the black elite is ‘the turnover in power of socio economic classes’ (van Wyk, 
2009).  This process includes: 
[1] Circulation via family connections: By 2007, Patrice Motsepe, the 
executive chairperson of ARM and brother of Bridgette Radebe (wife of the 
former Minister of Transport, Jeff Radebe), was considered the third richest 
South African, with an estimated fortune of £1.4 billion. In South Africa, one 
of the 183 people worth over £5.6 million is Tutukile Skweyiya (wife of the 
former Social Development Minister, Zola Skweyiya). Tutukile Skweyiya 
is also a major shareholder in Continental Africa Power Supplies, which 
was awarded a lucrative Eskom (the South African power utility company) 
contract.
[2] Redeployment: An increasingly common example of elite circulation is 
‘redeployment’ to the private sector, as a way to resolve political tensions 
within the African National Congress (ANC). Tokyo Sexwale was once the 
Gauteng Premier, then became a businessman, and was subsequently co-
opted as South Africa’s Minister for Human Settlement; a cabinet reshuffle 
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saw his return to business. Cyril Ramaphosa, ANC stalwart and negotiator in 
South Africa’s transition to democracy and former businessman. 
Similarly, Ashman, Fine and Newman assert, ‘the formation and incorporation 
of a small new black elite in South Africa, often out of former trade union leaders 
and political activists, has been an important part of the changes which have 
occurred since 1994’ (2011, p.184). The above illustrates that empowerment 
policies aimed at improving the lives of the majority of South Africans have 
benefitted only a few individuals. There are conflicting views from BEE 
consortia, policymakers and trade unions on what empowerment in South Africa 
advocates. Netshitenzhe (2009), former Head of Policy and Coordination in the 
Presidency, maintains that BEE needs to address ownership; ‘it will be incorrect 
to argue that the level of ownership of the mining sector is representative. We still 
have a long way to go, let alone meet the targets of the mining sector charter’. 
Mike Spicer (2010), a businessperson and former Anglo-American executive 
who was involved in many BEE transactions, disagrees, arguing that a large 
amount of potentially productive capital has gone into financing BEE deals, 
which represent a redistribution of wealth, not ownership through the creation 
of new wealth, new factories, or new mines. 
Significantly, unions and various politicians and businesspersons agree 
with Spicer’s view. Patricia de Lille (2010), former leader of The Independent 
Democrats, who was a whistle blower with reference to corrupt empowerment 
transactions, concurs with Spicer that where there is an opportunity for mining 
rights, the same people benefit, ‘its like a revolving door’. Businesspersons such 
as Spicer and Anglo American/Zimele Managing Director, Nick Van Rensburg 
(2010), have argued that BEE was not doing what it was intended to do, that is, 
improving the lives of South Africans. Van Rensburg (2010) states that Anglo-
Zimele empowers the entrepreneur and it is his/her job to assist the community:
There is no rule that states you cannot hire your family, which ultimately negates the 
process of empowering the community [and allows for nepotism, which has been 
a common occurrence in empowerment deals]. BEE is probably not what we are 
seeing in South Africa right now. BEE in my book is to reach the masses unbanked 
in South Africa and to tap into the entrepreneurship spirit of those people that want 
to get into their own business, but cannot access finance. 
While Erwin (2010) contends that B-BBEE was not designed to transform 
South African society, Higher Education Minister, Blade Nzimande (2010) and 
de Lille (2010) argue that B-BBEE is aimed at addressing inequalities, so that 
15
Horne: Empowerment and disempowerment in the South African mining sector
the black majority can have a meaningful stake in the South African economy. 
Detractors, such as mining magnet, Saki Macozoma (2010), have questioned 
‘how broad is broad?’ and stated that black business stands at a disadvantage, 
questioning and doubting whether white companies would adhere to B-BBEE.
From the exclusive interviews which were cross referenced with various 
literature and reports, the above section provided evidence that since 1994 
certain politically connected individuals have acquired significant BEE deals in 
the mining sector.  The consolidation of these elites has seen barriers to entry 
within the mining sector; consequently there are limited opportunities for black 
emerging companies to enter the market which inherently defeats the intended 
purpose of economic empowerment. 
3.2. Patterns of disempowerment
Chamber of Mines Head of Transformation Vusi Mabena (2015) asserts that the 
Marikana strike emanated from the socio-economic conditions moving beyond 
a labour relations issue to a community issue, ‘Lonmin had to take responsibility 
for it all and at the end of the strike; no one got what they wanted’. The 2012 
and 2014  mining strike in the North West province was not one associated with 
low wages as rock drillers, the lowest earning faction of mineworkers, receive 
approximately R10 000 per month, together with contributions made to their 
pension fund, medical aid fund and Unemployment Insurance Fund (Brand, 
2014). However, the true causes associated with the strikes include living 
wages and working conditions (Twala, 2013). This has been the expectation 
of mineworkers and families living in the mining areas of South Africa, with 
the unintended consequence of labour unrest, which can be attributed to the 
limitations of the mining charter in practice. 
The Mining Charter has stressed the importance of social and community 
empowerment through investments made in areas such as housing and living 
conditions and mine community development. NUM Transformation Manager, 
Luthando Brukwe (2015) argues that the Mining Charter is unique, in comparison 
to existing industry charters in South Africa, as it is required to ‘address not only 
skilling their employees but also up skilling the communities in which their 
operations are found in addition to those communities where they source their 
labour from’. 
Analysts have argued that there needs to be a concerted effort on the part 
of government to re-examine how labour standards, working and living 
conditions of mineworkers should be improved, taking into account the role 
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that empowerment policies have played in the mining sector (Leon, 2013). The 
salient problems within the mining sector are a decline in labour standards, 
wage disparities and the living wage, all of which are examined in the sections 
that follow. 
3.2.1. Labour standards
Theorists have argued that labour standards have deteriorated despite 
empowerment policies; this is due to the acquisition of marginal mines, which 
were costly to maintain post-1994.  According to Bezuidenhout (2008), labour 
standards fell as BEE increased; marginal mines transferred to a select few black 
individuals, required more input and to ensure a profit there was a reduction 
in the cost of labour. The running cost of marginal mines is high and often 
such mines can only be profitable if they take a ruthless approach to cutting 
costs. Empowerment activist, Joe Mthimunye (2014) concurs, ‘deep drilling is 
required due to depleting resources. Deep drilling is associated with an increased 
operating expense and [is] hazardous’. 
The labour standards also deteriorated due to outsourcing, as black 
beneficiaries of BEE employed labour brokers who were commissioned to 
employ mineworkers. The dominance of labour brokers in the mining sector 
indicates a high level of subcontracted mine employees who receive wages 
considerably lower than permanent employees, with no medical aid or pension 
fund contributions. It demonstrates, ‘the empowerment of some is often built 
on the disempowerment of others’ (Bezuidenhout, 2008, p. 186). University of 
Witwatersrand Vice Chancellor and Political Analyst, Professor Adam Habib 
(2009 and 2010) concurs: 
All the mines do is pay the labour broker, so the cost of labour is lowered. And if 
anybody goes on strike, the mines say that I have nothing to do with this, I gave 
the contract to XY labour broker, and this has nothing to do with us. The way they 
have actually done it is by contracting out. That is what COSATU (Congress of 
South African Trade Unions) has come out against heavily, and, in that context, 
if you end labour brokers what happens to the cost of labour? [Labour costs will 
increase; the profitability of mines will decrease]. A lot of the mines that got sold 
off to black entrepreneurs were marginal mines, basically, Anglo American etc. To 
make a profit on it was to drive down labour standards and they started to do this in 
quite a dramatic way.
Labour unionist, Zwelinzima Vavi (2010) contends that the thrust of 
empowerment was to ensure ‘decent work meaning both quantity and quality 
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of jobs, rights of workers to be treated fairly in the workplace, the right to 
collective bargaining, the right to health and safety and improve the standard  of 
life of all ordinary people’. However, there appears to be a disconnect between 
empowerment policies, the implementation thereof and the expectations from 
mineworkers. The achievements of black owners within the mining sector 
outweigh the success of the socio-economic development of mineworkers and 
their respective communities. 
3.2.2. Wage disparities
Rospabe (2001) states that one of the biggest challenges that face post-apartheid 
South Africa is the racial relations in the workplace. Wage discrimination to 
favour whites, although legally done away with in the 1980s, is still prevalent 
in many organisations (Hinks, Macun & Wood, 2007). In addition, much of 
the black workforce is still largely unskilled in comparison with their white 
counterparts. Rospabe (2001) conducted an econometric study on the role trade 
unions are playing to reverse these historical imbalances. The research found 
that trade unions have significant wage bargaining power for their members, 
and that the racial earning gap, where whites are paid more than their black 
counterparts on equivalent levels, occurs in the non-unionised sectors. This 
trend notwithstanding, the mining sector had realised gains in real wages since 
the advent of democracy. Workers in the mining and quarrying industries saw 
real median pay rise from  an estimated R3 000 per month in 1997 to R5 500.00 
in 2013 (LRS, 2014). 
Despite the real wage increase, the 2014 platinum strike began on 23 January 
after the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) reached 
a deadlock in separate negotiations with Amplats, Implats and Lonmin over 
wages and conditions of employment (ENCA, 2014). In contrast to the wave 
of strikes that had swept the platinum belt during the previous two years, the 
2014 action was protected. Of the approximately 200 000 workers employed, 
70 000 embarked on a strike demanding that the basic, entry-level salary for 
underground mine workers be increased to R12 500 per month (Sosibo, 2012; 
Hartford, 2014). This amount the miners declared a ‘living wage’ (Mantshantsha, 
2014), which was more than double the wage estimated at R6 000 paid at the 
time of the stoppage (Barron, 2014). The median national living wage in South 
Africa stood at R3 033 per month in 2013, while the poverty line for an average 
household of 3 to 4 people is a wage of R2 108 per month (LRS, 2014). Two 
months into the strike marked the beginning of the negotiation process. The 
platinum producers initially offered a nine per cent increase, followed by 10 per 
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cent; nevertheless, the negotiation process arrived at a deadlock. On 24 June 
2014, a three-year wage deal was signed stating that R12 500 will materialise, 
but only after three years (Brand, 2014). 
The salary of R12 500 is in sharp contrast to the annual remuneration 
packages (including salary) of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), who average 
an estimated R1.5 million for executive directors (Shumane and Taal, 2013). 
This is extraordinarily high compared with global standards, stated Massie, 
Collier and Crotty (2014) in their 2014 book, Executive Salaries in South 
Africa: Who Should Have a Say on Pay? Among the arguments advanced to 
defend the wage gap, is the law of supply and demand. Protractors contend that 
empowerment strategies were also intended to develop skills due to the shortage 
locally of highly educated and skilled people with fears that such highly skilled 
individuals might leave the country if not suitably remunerated (Seccombe, 
2014). Platinum company, Amplats CEO, Chris Griffith’s total remuneration 
package is estimated at R18 million per annum. Griffith’s defends his salary, ‘Am 
I getting paid on a fair basis for what I have to deal with in this company? Must 
I run this company and deal with all this ‘nonsense’ for nothing? I’m at work. 
I’m not on strike. I’m not demanding to be paid what I’m not worth’ (Seccombe, 
2014, p. 1. para. 15). The stark contrast in salaries between mineworkers and 
top executives indicates B-BBEE, or the Mining Charter, ultimately empowered 
black owners, who are billionaires, and the second tier of those who run the 
mines i.e. CEOs and executive directors, yet the policy has made limited inroads 
into the socio-economic upliftment of the majority of employees.
3.2.3. The living wage
Theoretically, a living wage allows the earner to accommodate for adequate 
shelter, food and basic necessities. The mining sector sourced cheap labour, 
placed them in hostels separate from their families, and created an unstable 
environment. As the platinum boom drew more workers to the mines, these 
settlements multiplied. A central grievance in the 2014 strike concerned the 
dismal living conditions of many workers in the platinum belt (Brand, 2014). 
All respondents argued that regardless of the basis of the strikes, they were 
fundamentally a living wage issue. 
Historically, miners had been migrant labourers who were housed in single-
sex hostels under appalling conditions. Implats Head of Sustainability of Ethical 
Risk, Andile Sangqu (2014) stated, ‘We have not been able to settle and normalise 
the effects of the past’. The mining sector was built on the migrant labour system. 
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According to NUM (2015), the mining sector is still predominantly dependent 
on the migrant labour system today. Mineworkers travel from communities and 
countries that are substantially long distances from mining operations. They 
have to leave their families and work on the mines to sustain their families at 
home by sending them money every month. Mining houses primarily provide 
single sex dormitories for migrant workers. In addition to having families where 
the mineworkers originally reside, they create new families near the mining 
operations (Mthimunye, 2014). The mineworkers’ salaries are now divided 
between two families and in an attempt to sustain both families; they obtain micro-
loans on a monthly basis at high interest rates. With individual salaries already 
consumed by two families, micro-loan repayments are not paid timeously. The 
Mining Charter dictates that should a mineworker have a family, he is required 
to reside in a family unit and if he is single, the mining house provides single 
sex dormitories. Amplats confirms that in an attempt to circumvent the lack of 
compliance with the Mining Charter, platinum mining houses began issuing 
‘living out allowances’. This allowance proved to be insufficient to sustain the 
mineworkers’ second families, primarily due to micro-loan repayments. As a 
result of undesirable living conditions, mineworkers created townships just 
outside the mining operations, particularly the Rustenburg area. 
  All respondents confirmed that the strikes were the result of social ills due to 
the unintended consequence of mineworkers, uprooted from their families, living 
in single sex dormitories. In 2012, there were approximately 40 shantytowns in 
the Rustenburg area, while an estimated 45 per cent of homes in the region 
were informal (against a national average of 15 per cent) (Chinguno, 2013). The 
majority of mining companies ignored this development, as did NUM and the 
government. ‘Yet a social and economic time bomb was being created,’ stated 
labour columnist, Terry Bell (Bell, 2014). 
Following the demise of apartheid, efforts were made by government to 
address this legacy (Kane-Berman & Moloi, 2014). The empowerment policy 
required mining companies to convert the dormitory facilities of single-
sex hostels to family units and single-occupant rooms by 2014, and to work 
with organised labour to help employees become homeowners (RSA, 2010). 
Mining companies offered workers who wished to leave the hostels a living-
out allowance of approximately R1 800, an estimated $145 per month (Van 
Rensburg, 2013), to assist with accommodation costs. The charter also required 
companies to work with surrounding communities in assessing and addressing 
developmental needs.
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    In interviews conducted by the South African Institute for Race Relations 
(IRR) for a report on the state of the mining sector after the Marikana strike of 
2012:
Workers who had been employed in the sector over preceding years (some as 
early as 1940) said they had to sleep in bunk beds that were no more than hollows 
carved into concrete. Only one blanket was provided to a miner – no pillow – 
and the rooms were not locked, meaning that workers had no security for their 
possessions. Ablutions were conducted in communal shower rooms that did not 
always have water; in these instances, the miners washed in a dam. Meals were 
insufficient, of poor quality, and could be denied as punishment (Kane-Berman 
& Moloi, 2014, p. 26). During an unauthorised visit to a Lonmin hostel in 2014, 
IRR researchers found both unclean, poorly maintained bathroom facilities for 
men who were still sharing rooms, as well as family units that they described as 
‘quite pleasant’ (Kane-Berman & Moloi, 2014). 
Progress was reportedly made with the conversion of hostels and community-
improvement endeavours, albeit at an uneven pace (Moolman, 2013; Kane-
Berman & Moloi, 2014). Mining houses, such as Harmony Gold and Amplats, 
have attempted to meet these targets; the Harmony Gold Mining Charter 
(Harmony, 2013) reported improvement regarding skills development; however, 
socio-economic development made limited progress. With reference to hostels, 
Harmony had made progress but not met its targets. In an attempt to address 
one of the primary grievances of overcrowding and appalling living conditions 
Harmony undertook to donate land for housing. The building of houses to 
accommodate workers, in the case of Lonmin, proved more problematic 
(Marinovich, 2014); the living-out allowance proved a case study in unintended 
consequences. Many workers treated this as a supplement to their wages and 
cut housing costs by seeking the cheapest accommodation available: shacks in 
a proliferating array of informal settlements that had little, if any, provision 
for water, sanitation, refuse removal, roads or electricity (Hartford, 2012). 
Shouldering certain expenses that had previously been borne by the mines 
(Kane-Berman & Moloi, 2014) and often supporting two families, one at their 
place of work, another in their home area, miners typically became enmeshed 
in debt to meet obligations, and found their salaries whittled away each month 
by garnishee orders for monies owed (Bond and Desvarieux, 2014). Lonmin 
Executive Vice President of Communications and Public Affairs, Lerato 
Molebatsi (2014), asserted that to address the housing issue successfully, ‘we 
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need to address the issue of migrant labour, which requires addressing the labour 
relations South Africa has with its neighbouring countries’.
International Labour Organisation (ILO) South Africa Director, Vic van 
Vuuren, argued that mining managers had failed to respond appropriately to 
these developments: 
Management is divorced from the socio-economic challenges facing their 
employees, such as the displacement from their homes, the long distances they 
have to travel and the slum-like conditions they live in… That is an indictment 
of management in general in South Africa. If they had been more engaged, they 
could have negated a lot of what is on the table now. It’s a situation that has been 
building for years and has blown up in their faces (Barron, 2014, p. 5). 
Chamber of Mines, Head of Transformation Vusi Mabena (2015) asserted 
that the DTI Codes of Good Practice and the Mining Charter require prudent 
implementation strategies so as not to create unrealistic expectations within 
communities and increase the resource burden of private companies to 
unsustainable levels. Research conducted by the IRR reported a sense among 
mine managers that the industry had to address socio-economic matters, which 
were ultimately the responsibility of government (Kane-Berman & Moloi, 
2014). The socio-economic empowerment in the mining sector cannot rest 
squarely on the shoulders of mining companies; it has to be a concerted effort 
between the private and the public sector. 
3.4. Ownership versus the socio-economic element of B-BBEE
The KPMG report (2008), which tracks BEE sector performance on an annual 
basis, does not focus on the beneficiaries of empowerment contracts and whether 
it is a circulation of black elite who dominate the mining sector; however, it 
has critiqued the barriers restricting economic transformation. In order of 
importance, the barriers include the following:
[1] The poverty barrier is of paramount importance and can be addressed 
through the empowerment elements of employment equity and socio-
economic development.  
[2]  The skills barrier can be addressed by the skills development element. 
[3]  The business barrier can be addressed by mine companies sourcing 
work from black enterprises, which is weighted according to the preferential 
procurement and enterprise development element.
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[4] The opportunity barrier focuses on black ownership and management 
control and although deemed important, does not receive priority.  
According to KPMG, each barrier needs to be tackled in sequence and once 
they have all been appropriately addressed, South Africa will be in a position 
to create equitable economic opportunities. The KPMG 2008 results identified 
that the acceleration of economic transformation would be possible by reducing 
the seven pillars, as provided in the Codes of Good Practice, to four pillars 
(KPMG, 2008). The four pillars would include black ownership; management 
control; employment equity and preferential procurement. The report argues 
that employment equity goes hand-in-hand with skills development; if one is 
achieved, the other is automatically achieved. The report suggested the same 
principle would apply to enterprise development and preferential procurement 
(KPMG, 2008). One can argue that the skills barrier should take priority over 
the poverty barrier and that the opportunity barrier should not be deemed a 
priority at this stage. South Africa currently faces structural unemployment, 
where there is a need to upskill the workforce. An estimated 40 000 black 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) close down each year due to the lack of 
business skills, moreover mining houses are faced with an estimated fifty  per 
cent of their workforce consisting of either unskilled or semi-skilled workers 
(Implats, 2014; Lonmin, 2014). Once the skills barrier is addressed, the country 
will see an upward mobility of society hence addressing the poverty barrier in 
South Africa.
In the recent interviews conducted in 2014 and 2015, all respondents agreed 
that the challenges associated with implementing the more difficult elements of 
socio-economic and skills development within the Mining Charter stem from 
structural and legacy issues, many of which the once oppressed are still dealing 
with today. The DTI (2015) added that, it is difficult for B-BBEE to address all 
problems that exist within society. As a result, socio-economic development has 
a smaller weighting because there are other dedicated government departments 
whose sole responsibility is to address social issues. The respondents agreed 
that empowerment policies have seen a few successes but not to the extent 
required for increased transformation. The majority of respondents believed 
that B-BBEE has benefitted a few and not the majority of South Africans 
it intended to benefit, such as the unemployed and those living in rural and 
disadvantaged communities. They held that transformation through B-BBEE 
begins by first uplifting communities and ensuring that they are involved in 
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economic activity. The Chamber of Mines of South Africa (COMSA) added 
that ‘…for more than 300 years, a certain population group has been ostracised 
to participate in the economy of the country; therefore we cannot expect to 
have achieved transformation within 20 years. We are currently on a journey…
over the last 10 years; it is unrealistic to say that B-BBEE is failing’. Lonmin 
(2014) and COMSA (2015) concur that the ‘Mining Charter is a step in the right 
direction’. Most of the respondents agreed that the reasons why transformation 
had been hindered were due to the lack of enforcement of B-BBEE on the part of 
government.  As stated earlier in this article, NUM asserts that the challenge lies 
with both government and the mining sector due to the latter not complying and 
the former hesitant to enforce.  Consequently, the more difficult implementation 
elements of the Mining Charter, according to private stakeholders, NUM 
(2015) and B-BBEE activists include enterprise and supplier development, 
procurement and socio-economic development. The DTI (2015) identified 
enterprise and supplier development as a difficult element to implement. They 
advised that the SME sector in South Africa would encourage the majority of 
the population to move from the lower income bracket to the middle-income 
bracket. Currently, the smaller black-owned businesses are often acquired by 
larger white-owned consortia, which diminish the entrepreneurial development 
and small business development within the South African economy. This has 
resulted in the DTI (2015) believing that enterprise and supplier development is 
necessary to further encourage transformation within South Africa’s economy; 
therefore it is classified as a priority element in addition to ownership and human 
resource development. Respondents from the mining houses acknowledge that 
they are not as committed as they should be in terms of delivering upon the 
requirements of the Charter and often refer to it as a ‘ticking the box exercise’. 
They believe that there needs to be an increased investment in human resource 
(skills) development, particularly within the area of hard skills, developing 
and offering employee ownership programs, and increased collaboration by all 
stakeholders. All stakeholders, with the exception of the DTI (2015), stress the 
need for considerable improvement of basic education in South Africa. Lonmin 
added that an educational blueprint for South Africa is needed, as this serves as 
the point of departure with respect to South Africa’s future needs, ‘we should be 
asking ourselves whether we have the right foundation for transformation to be 
realised as currently we don’t’.
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4. Conclusion
The root cause of labour unrest in the South African mining sector is circuitous, 
while the traditional rational choice theory provides a partial perspective; the 
theory does not adequately provide an explanation for the recurring problem 
that led to the death of mineworkers, the living wage and labour disparities.  An 
alternative discourse regarding causes of conflict in Africa as posited by Obi 
(2009) presented an opportunity for this study to go beyond the reductionist 
approach of resource curse issues (Rosser, 2006) and explore other factors that 
could be the root cause of labour conflicts in the South African mining sector. 
With an alternative discourse the root cause of labour unrest and conflict in the 
South African mining is due to libertarian paternalism in the form of patterns of 
empowerment, of a few wealthy elite, and disempowerment, of mineworkers, 
whose expectations from empowerment policies were improving the socio-
economic conditions, labour standards and addressing the wage disparities. 
Although libertarian paternalism succeeded to nudge actors to support 
empowerment in a manner that would not have been feasible due to the racial 
inequalities of the past, there are considerable limitations which have created 
labour instability.  Considerable resources have been spent on empowerment 
policies such as B-BBEE and the mining charters; billions of rands have been 
made available for funding black empowered businesses over the last 10 years. 
The labour unrest within the mining sector brings into focus the inadequacies of 
these empowerment policies. 
    In the interviews conducted and triangulated with existing literature, mining 
reports and data, the focus on empowerment policies is on black ownership in the 
mining sector rather than on the socio-economic transformation of mineworkers 
and the surrounding communities. Moreover, patron-client relations exist, with 
a few politically connected beneficiaries of empowerment policies who continue 
to dominate the market resulting in barriers to entry for emerging entrepreneurs. 
The Mining Charter sets targets to which mining companies should comply; 
however, the aspect of real empowerment across a broad-based spectrum requires 
accountability and transparency. There are limited restrictions on how many 
contracts an individual can acquire. Despite legislation to ensure the upliftment 
of mineworkers there are inadequate sanctions to ensure the entrenchment of 
empowerment policies. 
25
Horne: Empowerment and disempowerment in the South African mining sector
    To date, no mining company’s license has been revoked if empowerment 
targets were not met. There is a growing concern that the recurrence of labour 
unrest in the mining sector will have a devastating effect on the South African 
economy, which narrowly avoided a recession in 2014 due to the five-month 
long platinum industry strike. Most stakeholders agree that empowerment is 
an essential component to the transformation of the mining sector, however 
empowerment can only be realised during periods of high and sustained 
inclusive economic growth. All the above-mentioned factors find their interplay 
in the social forces, global processes and transnational forces as represented 
by global markets and capital owners. These issues are beyond simple logic 
of union rivalry, local political feasibility, and predatory ruling elites often 
associated with the resource curse explanation. An alternative discourse 
regarding the causes of conflict in the South African mining sector is needed 
to address the recurring problems factoring in that blessings, uncertainties and 
curses co-exist and co-evolve. Implats Head of Sustainability of Ethical Risk, 
Andile Sangqu (2014) asserts that empowerment becomes a possibility during 
economic growth; yet becomes problematic in the absence of economic growth. 
The leaders in the mining sector have failed to communicate the realities. In the 
absence of communication between mineworkers, their respective companies 
and government, the expectations of mineworkers cannot be managed with 
reference to empowerment policies, as workers require immediate tangibles 
rather than long-term solutions. Mining houses interviewed are of the view 
that in order to prevent a strike of such magnitude from reoccurring, increased 
transparency and engagement between employers and employees are required; in 
addition to up skilling and educating people to prevent violence. The long-term 
empowerment plans should be based not merely on ensuring that mineworkers 
have improved labour standards and living conditions in hostels; it must include 
skills development as the imperative for the more than 40 per cent unskilled and 
semi-skilled mineworkers, thus meeting the demands of a globally competitive 
economy. All these recommended steps however should dovetail with an 
alternative discourse of looking at the resource conflict in Africa.
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